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NOTES:AND COMMENT
vote upon the, increase in their salaries; and if a case comes to trial
require the minority stockholders to come in with clear proof of
wrong-doing or oppression and have more than a claim based on
mere differences of opinion upon the question whether equal services
could have been procured for somewhat less. The Equity Courts should
stress proof, and a general allegation of the facts why such a salary
is excessive, this should be sufficient to give the minority stockholders
an opportunity to present their proof at the trial.
CLEMENT M. MAWACKE
Easements: Prescription, Implied Grant, Necessity, Dedication and
Estoppel
Frank C. Shilling 'Co. v. Detry, 233 N.W. 635, Nyas an action
brought by the plaintiff, Frank C. Shilling Co., to determine their
interests in a tweniy foot strip of land lying on the western boundary
of certain land belonging to the defendant Detry. This strip separates
the defendant's land from the 'Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.'s
right of way', and runs to another tract to the south owned by the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs acquired title to this twenty foot strip, and also
to the larger lot to the south thereof, by a deed from Phoebe Elmore,
whose ancestor in title was Andrew E. Elmore, dated September 1926.
The defendant's claim dates back to August 1902 at which time he
acquired by a deed from Andrew E. Elmore an irregular lot'immedi-
ately to the east of this stirp. The title conveyance, recording, posses-
sion, etc., are all admitted.
The only question in issue is, as to the construction and effect of
certain language used in describing the boundaries of the land con-
veyed to the defendant to the effect that: "Commencing at a point,
* * * which point shall also be sufficient distance from the land of
the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. conveyed * * * so that an
alley might be established twenty feet in width extending southwesterly
along the railroad right of way." At the time this conveyance was
made, both the twenty foot strip and the lot conveyed were submerged.
Detry entered into possession immediately after conveyance was
made to him. He filled in this twenty foot strip with cinders so as to
make it usable as'a driveway. During the ensuing twenty-two years
both Detry and his tenants used this strip as an alley, and their user
was interrupted only once for a period of less than two years when a
restaurant erected in 1904 blocked their entrance to the northern end
of this strip. This restaurant was erected by a lessee of one of Detry's
tenants, and rental was paid for the use 'of the ground to both Detry's
tenant and to Elmore through his agent. After that two year period the
restaurant was moved so that it occupied only three fifths of the twenty
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foot strip, the remainder of the building on the railroad right of way.
Rental from then on was paid only to Elmore and the railroad com-
pany. Detry and his tenants continued their use of the alley until the
present action.
The question for the court to decide was whether or not the above
facts constituted such an interruption of 'adverse user as would prevent
Detry from obtaining an easement. Did the payment of rent to Elmore,
coupled with forcing the defendant and his tenants to divert from the
west end of this strip by the erection of the restaurant and use the rail-
toad right of way instead, interrupt the defendant's occupation as
user ?
The court felt that this constituted a substantial and material inter-
ruption of the defendant's otherwise continuous user, citing 115 Wis.
68 (90 N.W. 1019, 1025) "If an owner of land is disseized thereof by
another, so as to start a period of adverse possession in favor of the
latter, any notorious entry thereon by such owner or his agent by his
direction, for purpose of dispossessing the adverse occupant, operates
to interrupt the running of the statute. It terminates the period of
adverse occupancy absolutely and for all practical purposes. The
statute can be set running again only by a fresh disseisin which will
constitute merely the commencement of another twenty years regard-
less of the length of time of interruption of the adverse occupancy
continued. Anything that actually breaks the continuity of the adverse
possession of the property renders it harmless as regards the title
thereof, no matter what may subsequently occur."
Payment of rent was clearly an interruption of the running of the
statutory period, breaking the otherwise continuous user of the strip
in dispute.
The defendant also argued that even if there had not been an
easement acquired by adverse possession, there was an implied grant
of this strip as an alley. This contention could not be sustained because
Chapter 235.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1929) expressly prohibits
implied grants in the following words: "No covenant shall be implied
in any conveyance of real estate whether such conveyance contain
special covenants or not." Or as expressed by Ryan, C. J. 38 Wis.
559 .... " * * * It is always safest to let written contracts speak for
themselves. Parties ought to make their own contracts complete. Alien-
ations of land are or ought to be, grave and deliberate transactions.
Every conveyance should contain the certainty of the thing granted
to the full extent of the grant. What may be expressed enlarging or
restricting the grant in particular cases, should not be left to implica-
tion."
Though easements of necessity of right of way are recognized, we
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find in 126 Wis. 270...2 * * * that necessity must be so clear and
absolute that without the easement the grantee cannot in any reason-
able sense be said to have acquired that which is expressly granted;
such indeed as render inconceivable that the parties could have dealt
in the matter without both intending to confer the easement." Quite
clearly, then, Wisconsin is not among the states which enforces the
doctrine of a "reasonable" necessity.
Under such clearly defined policy, the court could see no use of
reading into the words, "Commencing at a point * * * so that an
alley might be established" any express grant of this strip as an alley
and especially when it is considered that at the time of the grant both
the lot sold and the strip now involved were completely submerged.
No evidence was presented which would show that this strip had
been dedicated to a public use. Apparently no plat of this area was
ever filed to indicate any intention to make a dedication, nor had there
ever been any acceptance by the city either by way of ordinance or
otherwise upon which to base a claim of dedication.
Likewise, because the question of estoppel was not pleaded, the
court would not consider whether the long continued user, or Elmore's
permitting Detry to fill in this strip so as to make it passable, misled
Detry into the mistaken idea that he had a right to this strip as an
alley. The pleadings did not set forth facts which would establish an
easement by prescription, dedication or grant, and the defendant must
discontinue his user of this way.
LAWRENCE WALSH.
Criminal Law: Searches and Seizures
In Warner et al. v. Gregory et al, ____ Wis. 233 N.W. 631,
an order directing trustees for the benefit of creditors to permit the
district attorney to examine the books in the trustees' possession for
use in a criminal investigation against the assignors, a copartnership
was held not to violate the 4th Amendment to the U. S. constitution,
protecting the citizens from unreasonable search and seizure, nor the
5th Amendment, providing that no person shall be witness against
himself.
This protection, guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendmentse
have been construed to apply to private papers, books and documents
of an individual as well as safeguarding his home from unreasonable
search and himself from incrimination. Gouled v. U. S. 255 U.S. 298;
Boyd v. U. S. 116 U.S. 616; Johnson v. U. S. 47 L.R.A. (n.s.) 263.
The protection thus guaranteed is fully recognized by the Federal
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 7, No. 9, Chap. 3, which, though it provides that
it is the duty of the bankrupt to "submit to an examination concerning
